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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court maintains jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
and Section 78-2-2 (3) (i) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
This is a response to an appeal from a Summary Judgment Decision 
of the Honorable James S. Sawaya of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County dated October 6, 1986. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This proceeding was commenced when the Appellant filed 
this law suit seeking a refund from the Respondents of the sum 
of One Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Eight and 
6/100 ($152,258.61) Dollars, for property taxes which had been 
paid to the Respondents under protest. 
Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by both 
parties. The Respondent's Motion was granted by Judge Sawaya 
while the Appellant's Motion was denied. This Appeal is from 
that final Order. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The determinative issue presented by this appeal is 
whether certain parcels of real estate, legal title to which is 
held in the Utah State Retirement Fund, are exempt from ad 
valorem property taxation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Legislature has created, via statute, several 
public retirement systems, including separate systems. The 
legislature also created, via statute, the Utah State Retirement 
Fund, a trust fund to hold legal title to the funds (49-9-10, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, hereinafter referred by 
"Section") and agencies to administer the fund: (1) the Utah 
State Retirement Office to handle the daily administrative 
matters for the trustees and the fund (Section 49-9-2), and (2) 
the Utah State Retirement Board to act as the trustee to control 
the custody, manage and invest the funds of the Fund (Chapter 
74, Laws of Utah 1963, as amended)• 
The Trustees are authorized to merge the assets of the 
retirement systems for purposes of investment and administrative 
efficiency and to prevent unnecessary duplications in adminis-
tration. The merged investments of all of the systems are 
generally known as the Utah State Retirement Fund (the Fund). 
Reserves are generated on behalf of the Fund by 
sources such as the towns, cities, counties, school districts, 
sewer districts, colleges, universities, libraries and other 
"political subdivisions" within the State. Contributions are 
also made by the State as the employer's share of the retirement 
cost. The contributions by the State as an employer, however, 
are in actuality additional employee compensation. Once made, 
the employer has lost legal and beneficial ownership of the 
contributions as they will not revert to the employer even if 
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the employee is terminated before he has any vested rights in 
these contributions. Instead, the contributions made as "add-
itional compensation" on behalf of the employer will remain in 
the fund in favor of the remaining beneficiaries. 
While the sources of funding described above are 
important, the most significant source of funding is the with-
holding of a percentage of the salary of the employees of each 
of the political subdivisions eligible to participate in the 
plan. The funds withheld are contributions by the employees of 
their own earnings. Accordingly, these contributions vest 
immediately, and the employee will receive a "refund" should 
resignation occur prior to retirement (Section 49-10-6(23)). 
The fund is authorized to invest up to 15% of the book 
value of the investment portfolio in real estate (Section 
49-9-12(1)(m)). Pursuant to this authorization, the trustees 
have invested trust funds in numerous parcels of real estate. A 
portion of the real estate purchased as an investment may be 
leased to individuals who pursue a business conducted for profit 
thereon and are thereby subjected to the Privilege Tax (Section 
59-13-73) . This section provides for a tax upon the use of 
property otherwise exempt from ad valorem taxation if used "in 
connection with a business conducted for profit,...". Section 
59-13-74 provides the amount of the privilege tax "shall be in 
the same amount and to the same extent as the ad valorem pro-
perty tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner 
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thereof." The parcels of real estate used in a manner that 
generates the privilege tax are not the parcels of real estate 
that have generated the controversy of which this suit is the 
subject. 
(The statutes relating to the Utah State Retirement 
Systems and to ad valorem taxation have been recodified by the 
1987 Utah State Legislature. The recodified statutes have been 
renumbered and are similar to the statutes at issue in the 
instant case. All references contained herein are to the former 
statutes as numbered prior to their recodification since those 
statutes are controlling for the tax year in issue.) 
In May of 1985, the Respondents threatened to sell at 
tax sale, real properties, the legal title to which were held by 
the Appellant. Appellant paid, under protest, the sum of One 
Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Eight and 61/100 
($152,258.61) Dollars, for property taxes. Appellant filed this 
law suit seeking a refund from the Respondents of the taxes paid 
under protest. Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by both 
parties. The Respondent's Motion was granted by Judge Sawaya 
while the Motion of the Appellants was denied. This Appeal is 
from that final order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 31st day of May, 1983, the Utah State Tax 
Commission determined that certain vacant land located within 
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Utah County and held in the name of the Utah State Retirement 
Fund was exempt from taxation as properties owned by a state 
agency. (T-00051-00053.) (See also addendum to Appellant's 
Brief.) Thereafter, on the 29th day of April, 1985, the Utah 
State Tax Commission determined that property held in the name 
of the Utah State Retirement Fund and located within Salt Lake 
County did not belong to a State Agency or Political Subdivision 
of the State of Utah and was not therefore exempt from taxation 
thereby sustaining the determination of the County Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County that the property in the name 
of the Fund was taxable. (T-00015 - T-00020.) A complete copy 
of said decision is set forth in the addendum to Respondent's 
Brief. 
Based upon the decision of the Tax Commission, Salt 
Lake County proceeded to tax Appellant's property. Appellant 
thereafter filed a complaint against Salt Lake County which was 
ultimately decided in favor of Salt Lake County and against 
Appellant on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (T-35-54 and 
T-70-71.) Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of the 
trial court in granting judgment to Respondent thereby 
sustaining the taxability of properties held in the name of the 
Utah State Retirement Fund. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS (OUTLINE) 
I. The Fund (as opposed to the Utah State Retirement Office or 
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the Utah State Retirement Board) is not an agency or 
political subdivision of the State, and therefore does not 
qualify for the exemption from ad valorem taxation provided 
by Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution 
or Section 59-2-1, the statute that operates to implement 
the relevant constitutional provision. 
II. Notwithstanding the conclusion with respect to I. above, 
the real estate that is the subject of this case is not 
exempt from ad valorem taxation because it is not property 
"of" the State, county, etc. 
A. Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, and 
Section 59-2-1 both provide as a condition to ex-
emption that before real estate may be exempted from 
ad valorem taxation it must be "property of" the State 
(or county, city, etc.) 
B. The criterion on which exemptions are based in Utah is 
ownership rather than use. 
C. The real estate subject to the ad valorem taxation 
that is the subject of this suit is not "property of 
the State" as intended by the drafters of the relevant 
provisions. 
D. The presumption in general is that exemptions from ad 
valorem taxation are to be strictly construed. This 
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presumption is particularly strong in the case of 
property owned by a non-public body. 
III. To exempt the real estate from taxation would provide for 
discrimination without a rational basis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FUND (AS OPPOSED TO THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
OFFICE OR THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD) IS NOT AN 
AGENCY OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE, AND 
THEREFORE DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR THE EXEMPTION FROM AD 
VALOREM TAXATION PROVIDED BY ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 2 
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, OR SECTION 59-2-1, THE 
STATUTE THAT OPERATES TO IMPLEMENT THE RELEVANT 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. 
The Board argues that both the Board and the Fund are 
to be considered State Agencies by claiming that the Fund is not 
a separate legal entity and thus is indistinguishable from the 
agencies charged with its administration. However, for the 
following reasons, the Fund is in fact a separate entity that 
does not qualify as a State Agency. 
First, the Fund is organized by a separate statute 
rather than as part of the statute creating the Board. Had the 
Fund been intended to be indistinguishable from the Board or 
otherwise had been intended to be considered a part of an 
amalgamated group of conglomerated organizations, it would have 
been created by the statute creating the amalgamated group. 
Second, Utah Code Annotated, Section 49-10-8, creating 
the Fund, specifically provides for it as a separate entity by 
establishing it as a "trust fund." The Statute speaks of the 
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Fund as a separate entity by providing for a separate trustee 
and in general dealing with the Fund as an entity onto itself. 
Thirdly, the purpose in providing for the Fund as an 
independent trust fund was to establish between the Fund and the 
Board the legal relationships normally found in a trust. This 
arrangement separates the Fund from the trustees, the effect of 
this is that although the Fund is administered by a state agency 
it should not itself be considered as such. This conclusion is 
supported by two cases. In Chez v. The Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 62 P. 2d 549, the Utah Supreme Court addressed an issue 
with regard to the State Insurance Fund which provides workmans 
compensation insurance for employers and is administered by the 
State, and stated: 
"The employer really pools his premiums in the State 
Fund to create a fund for the payment of an obligation 
for which it is liable. It is a common fund belonging 
to the participating employers. It is therefore not 
derived from anything owing to the state nor paid out 
on behalf of any state obligation. 
...The Fund is publically administered, but its 
debtors are not debtors to the state. It belongs, not 
to the state, but to the contributing employers for 
their mutual benefit. 
...Owing to the fact that we have concluded that the 
State Insurance Fund, while a public fund in the sense 
of being administered by a public body, it is not 
public money in the sense that it is money of the 
state to be used for and on behalf of the state for 
state expenditure." 
The principle being espoused is that assets of a fund 
which is administered by the state but funded through private 
contributions to address a private responsibility, are not 
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property of the state. It also describes the important dis-
tinction between a fund established for the benefit of certain 
non-public interests and the public body which administers the 
fund as trustee, and thus recognizes the application of the 
legal principles described by trust law to the relationship 
between a trust fund and its public trustee/administrator. 
In Chez, the Court indicates that the insurance fund 
was in the nature of a private business, and that administration 
or even participation by the state did not transform the fund 
into state property. The fact that the State administers the 
fund does not transform the fund into a responsibility of the 
state or the citizens thereof. The Court concluded that if the 
insurance fund were liquidated, the assets would be returned to 
the contributing businesses. Similarly, if the Retirement Fund 
in the instant case were to be liquidated, the assets would be 
distributed first to the beneficiaries with vested rights and to 
the employee contributors. 
It may be argued that Chez is distinguishable from the 
instant case because the state did not make regular contribu-
tions to the insurance fund (except for those which covered its 
own liability as an employer) that was part of the issue in that 
case, while in this case regular contributions are made by the 
state to the Retirement Fund. However, this is a distinction 
without a difference since the state contributions to the 
Retirement Fund do not belong to the state; they are simply 
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compensation in addition to the employees salary in which the 
employee may obtain vested rights at a later date, but in any 
case will not return to the state but will remain part of the 
Fund for the benefit of remaining employees should an employee 
resign before their rights have vested in the employer (state) 
portion of the contribution. 
The conclusion to be derived from an application of 
the principles expressed above to the instant case is that the 
Utah State Retirement Fund, like the insurance fund described in 
Chez, is an entity separate and apart from the state agency 
empowered with its administration. And, as a separate entity, 
it may not somehow be characterized as a "public body" merely 
because the body empowered with the administrative function may 
qualify as a "public body." 
The conclusion that the legal relationships described 
by trust law apply to a trust fund as the "res" owned by a party 
other than the public trustee also finds support in the conclu-
sion of the Attorney General in his decision cited by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General v. Utah 
State Retirement Board and Utah State Retirement Fund, et al., 
652 P.2d 1332 which states: 
In a formal opinion, no. 78-007, the Attorney General 
has ruled that the Retirement Fund was not a state 
fund but rather a public trust fund and that as such 
the fiduciary responsibilities of the Board "would be 
in conflict with control exercised by the state 
auditor or other public official." 
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The Attorney General defined the fund correctly and 
this definition was acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Attorney General defined the retirement fund as a "public trust 
fund", the property of which does not belong to the state or the 
government. The Fund is not a State Fund; it is a Public Trust 
Fund. A public trust is a legal term which is correctly defined 
in Duchesne as a trust in which the beneficiary is not a defi-
nite or ascertainable being, such as defining a class of 
individuals without identifying the definite identities which 
may change. A private trust on the contrary, is one in which 
the beneficiaries are absolutely identified and in whom the 
beneficial ownership is absolutely vested. The Board uses the 
term "Public Trust" in an incorrect manner. The choice of 
"Public" as a modifier for "Trust" does not impart a reference 
to a state or government owned entity as the term is commonly 
used. The Court in Hansen, supra, acknowledges this on page 
1338 by stating that the Retirement Fund is administered "solely 
for the benefit of the beneficiaries and not for the public at 
large." 
The only concrete authority in support of the claim 
that the Fund (versus the Board) is an independent state agency 
is a phrase cited in the Boardfs memorandum from Hansen, supra, 
at page 1340 wherein the Court refers to the Fund as "a qua-
si-state fund; ..." It is submitted that this is an incorrect 
characterization of the Fund. It should initially be noted that 
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this characterization is inconsistent with other opinions of the 
Court cited in this brief, a prime example being Chez, supra. 
The characterization of the Fund as "a quasi-state 
fund" also appears inconsistent with the characterization of the 
Fund in other segments of Hansen, supra, itself. It is submit-
ted that the intent behind the use of the phrase "quasi-state 
fund" was to indicate that the Fund is affiliated with the state 
because it is state administered. However, the Court also 
recognized, by the use of the modifier "quasi" that the fund is 
not to be considered as a state agency, and does not benefit 
from this characterization. It is also submitted that the use 
of the term "quasi-state fund" was intended to indicate that 
status of the Fund was similar to the insurance fund described 
in Chez. This interpretation would appear to be consistent with 
the intent expressed in the body of the Hansen opinion and 
reconcile with the intent expressed in Chez. And, finally, 
perhaps the characterization of the Fund as "quasi" is appropri-
ate, describing the state administration of a (public) trust 
fund owned by unascertained individuals as a group and without 
any state ownership, yet providing an important distinction in 
that the Fund does not qualify as a state agency, and thereby 
does not derive any of the benefits nor assume any of the 
burdens associated with agencies of the state. 
The conclusion that the Fund is not a state agency is 
further supported by an examination of the fiduciary 
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relationship that exists between a trustee and the beneficiaries 
of a trust. Generally, a trustee must administer the trust 
solely for the benefit of the trust and beneficiaries. The 
trustee owes an undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries and must 
protect and preserve the trust. See Sundquist v. Sundquist, 6 39 
P.2d 181 (Utah). It is possible that the trustee of the Fund, 
the Board, will be required to protect the assets of the trust 
in favor of the beneficiaries; i.e., the retired and vested 
state employees in conflict with asserted interests of the 
State. If the fund is considered a state agency or state fund, 
the trustee—an alleged independent state agency—would be put 
in an impermissible conflict of interest since the state agency 
would have a fiduciary duty to protect the fund against 
itself—the State. Thus, the legal relationships between a 
trust, the trustee and the beneficiary, intended by the 
legislature in creating the Fund are inconsistent with the 
proposition that the Fund is a state agency, and therefore the 
conclusion to be drawn is the agency is not a "state agency." 
In sum, an examination of each of the aforementioned 
arguments supports a conclusion that the Fund is not a state 
agency. When examined as a whole, one is left with the 
inescapable conclusion that not only is the Fund not a state 
agency, but it was never so intended. 
POINT II 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO I, 
ABOVE, THE REAL ESTATE THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS 
CASE IS NOT EXEMPT FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION BECAUSE IT 
IS NOT PROPERTY "OF" THE STATE, COUNTY, ETC. 
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In Point II, the County will show that, 
notwithstanding an adverse conclusion with respect to Point I, 
the real estate that is the subject of this suit does not 
qualify for exemption from ad valorem taxation because it is not 
"owned" by a body whose real estate is eligible for exemption 
from taxation. 
A. The criterion on which exemptions of property owned by 
a governmental body are based in Utah is ownership 
rather than use. 
Providing exemptions from ad valorem taxation for 
certain properties owned by governmental bodies is a universal 
practice throughout the United States. See 3 A.L.R. 1439. In 
providing these exemptions, however, the states are split on the 
basis to be used in determining the properties to be granted 
such an exemption. 3 A.L.R. 1439. 
In one group of states, property ownership is the 
criterion used to determine which properties will be granted 
exemption from ad valorem taxatin (referred to hereafter as 
"ownership" states). Conforming with these states, the Utah 
Supreme Court declared in City of Springville v. Johnson, 37 
P.522 (Utah 1894) that all property owned by the State of Utah 
was exempt notwithstanding its non-public use. Thus, in Utah, 
the determinative criterion is ownership rather than use. 
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Accordingly, ownership is the primary issue in Point II of this 
brief. 
The other group of states grants exemptions for 
properties devoted to public uses (referred to hereinafter as 
"use" states). In these states, the determinative criterion is 
the purpose to which the property is being put. Thus, in these 
states, it is possible to have property owned by a governmental 
body subject to ad valorem taxation if it is not devoted to 
public use; e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. County of 
Fulton, 171 A.2d 882. 
The Board relies heavily on two cases (Commonwealth v. 
Dauphin County, et al., 6 A.2d 870, 335 Pa. 177, and State 
Teachers Retirement Board v. Board of Tax Appeals, 177 Ohio 
Street, 61, 202 N.E. 2d 418) in which the taxability of property 
of the respective State Retirement Systems were at issue. In 
both cases, exemptions were granted with respect to the real 
property that was the source of the controversy. At first 
glance, it would appear that these cases are on point. However, 
on closer examination this is not the case. 
The primary reason these cases are inapplicable is 
that they are both decided in States in which the criterion used 
to determine the exempt status is the purpose for which the 
property is used (use states). The reason this makes the cases 
inapplicable is that the analysis used to arrive at a conclusion 
is entirely different in use states than the analysis used in 
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ownership states, and therefore inapplicable in states, such as 
Utah, in which the issue centers around ownership. In both 
cases, the constitutions and implementing statutes indicated 
that property tax exemptions would be permitted only for real 
estate used for public purposes (see Dauphin County, supra, at 
page 8 73) . 
Thus, in both cases the analysis used by the court is 
to determine whether the property that was the source of the 
suit was used for public purposes. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in Dauphin County, supra, viewed the issue as follows: 
"The resulting issue is whether the fund of the 
Retirement System is property used for a public 
purpose of the Commonwealth, and whether the real 
estate here involved is being held by it as a 
properly acquired part of that fund, rather than 
as a private business enterprise." 
Thus, the thrust of inquiry in these cases—the 
determination of the purpose to which the property is being 
put—proceeds along an entirely different line of analysis than 
is required in an ownership state. A prime example of the 
difference in the source of inquiry to be pursued is found in 
decisions from the State of Kansas. In City of Harper v. Fink, 
148 Kan. 278, 80 P.2d 1080, the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted 
the relevant constitutional and statutory authority to require 
an analysis based upon the ownership of property. In that case, 
the court examines the various aspects of ownership to determine 
whether exemptions were to be granted. 
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However, in 1963, the relevant statutes were amended 
to change the determinative criterion on which exemptions were 
granted from ownership to use. Accordingly, in Arkansas City, 
v. The Board of County Commissioners of Sumner County, 197 Kan. 
728, 420 P.2d 1016, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized the 
effect the amendment had in the analysis used to determine 
whether an exemption was to be granted. The court indicates 
that ownership, and the factors used to determine ownership, are 
now irrelevant. Instead, the important factor is use, and the 
court proceeds to examine whether the property in question is 
used for a public purpose. 
Thus, the factors examined in a "use" state to deter-
mine whether property is exempt from taxation, such as whether 
the property is held for governmental or proprietary reasons, or 
the underlying reasons for the existence of the body holding 
title to the property in question (e.g., Dauphin County, su-
pra.), or whether the property is used in a manner consistent 
with the expressed purpose behind the organization of the body 
claiming the exemption (e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike, supra.), 
are irrelevant in a state, such as Utah, in which the criterion 
is the ownership of property. Because the criterion used is 
different, the factors used in making the decision are different 
(e.g., whether the existence of a retirement system constitutes 
a "public purpose" via the need to retain quality teachers and 
therefore improve the public school system, or that exemption 
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from taxes will reduce the payments needed from the state to 
conserve the fund and thus exemption is in itself a "public 
purpose." or, as the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally acknowl-
edged, that the State Retirement Fund benefits the beneficiaries 
individually by providing for their retirement and does not 
inure to the benefit of the state. Robert B. Hansen v. Utah 
State Retirement Board, 652 P. 2d 1332 (Utah, 1982) at page 
1338) . As a result, both of the cases (in addition, Common-
wealth v. Schuylkill County, 62 A.2d 922, which is cited and is 
also irrelevant for the same reason) and the statements there-
from relied on by the Board are irrelevant to the determination 
of whether an exemption is to be granted in the instant case. 
It is noted that on page 29 of their brief, the Board 
indicates that every other state that has ruled on the issue of 
tax exemptions on the real properties of governmental retirement 
systems has held those properties to be exempt from ad valorem 
property taxes. We would like to submit that State Teachers 
Retirement Board v. Kinney, 68 Ohio St.2d 195, 429 N.E.2d 1069, 
although a decision in a "use" state, which , as indicated 
above, provides limited guidance, holds that real property 
comprising a parking lot owned by the State Teachers Retirement 
Board was not used for a public purpose, and therefore was not 
exempt from taxation. 
B. Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, and 
Section 59-2-1 both provide as a condition to 
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exemption that before real estate may be exempted from 
ad valorem taxation it must be "property of" the State 
(or county, city, etc.). 
Having determined that Utah is an ownership state, the 
issue is to determine who owns the property in question. The 
first step in answering this question is to examine what is 
required for ownership. The source of the determinative lan-
guage is Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, as 
amended effective January 1, 1983, which provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
1. All tangible property in the state, not exempt under 
the laws of the United States, or under this Constitu-
tion, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in 
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided 
by law. 
2. The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and 
public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special 
districts, and all other political subdivisions 
of the state, except that to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the Legislature property 
of a county, city, town, special district or 
other political subdivision of the state located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined 
by law may be subject to the ad valorem property 
tax; 
Utah Code, Section 5 9-2-1, implementing the aforementioned 
section of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
1. The following property is exempt from taxation; 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and 
public libraries; 
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(b) property exempt under the laws of the United 
States, the property of counties, cities, towns, 
special districts, and all other political 
subdivisions of the state; 
The relevant language of both the Constitutional provision and 
the statute is the phrase "...property of ..." 
C. The real estate subject to the ad valorem taxation 
that is the subject of this suit is not "property of 
the State" as intended by the drafters of the relevant 
provisions. 
In Hoover Equipment Company v. The Board of Tax Roll 
Corrections of Adair County, 436 P.2d 645 (Oklahoma 1967) and 
State of Oklahoma v. Dunbar, 618 P.2d 900 (Oklahoma 1980), in 
which the issue was the ownership of certain properties for 
purposes of exemption from ad valorem taxation, the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma interpreted the same language to mean "owned 
by" the body in question, and stated the determinative factor 
thus to be ownership. 
Thus, the real issue is what constitutes ownership. 
In addressing the question of ownership, the court in Hoover, 
supra., indicates that "...when a state statute ... requires 
property to be assessed against its owner, "...it means the 
general and beneficial owner—the person whose interest is 
primarily one of possession and enjoyment...and not the person 
who retains the legal title...."." The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
elaborated in Dunbar, supra, where it stated that "...we find 
the fact that legal title to the properties in the case at bar 
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is in [the name of the Respondents] is not in itself deter-
minative of the tax exemption under the "property of" portion of 
Section 6. The determinative factor is "ownership." The Court 
then summarized this proposition by stating that to determine 
ownership" ...we must determine the quantum of interest which 
[the Respondents] have in the properties." 
The Wyoming Supreme Court also addressed the issue in 
State v. Underwood, 85 P.2d 707 (Wyoming, 1939), where an 
exemption was claimed based upon the fact that legal title was 
held by the state in trust for the benefit of an individual, by 
quoting 61 C.J. 366 that (see also 84 C.J.S. 386): 
"the public property which is thus immune from taxa-
tion includes all property...which legally or equi-
tably belongs wholly to the state, no matter on what 
basis its title rests. But the immunity extends only 
to such property as may properly be said to belong to 
the state and it is not sufficient that the state may 
have some indirect...interest therein. In 61 C.J. it 
is stated that "property held by the state as trustee 
for others is not exempt."" 
The concept of "ownership" of property held in trust 
has been addressed in numerous cases. In People ex rel 
Olmstead, County Collector v. University of Illinois, 159 N.E. 
811, (Illinois, 1928) the Illinois Supreme Court held that 
property held in trust by a state university for the benefit of 
certain student groups was not tax exempt. In addressing this 
question, the court states: 
...the Rule is to be deduced that ownership of proper-
ty in the state, such as exempts that property from 
taxation, must be exclusive and free from any kind of 
legal or equitable interest in any one else. If the 
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state holds property as trustee, not for the public, 
but for the benefit of specified private persons, such 
property cannot be said to belong to the state so as 
to exempt it from taxation. It seems clear that the 
state does not have exclusive ownership of the proper-
ty involved, 
...It further appears in the application of this test 
that, acting as trustee, the state through the Board 
of Trustees of the University, does not hold the 
property in trust for the public, but that a certain 
class of specified private persons are the only ones 
to receive beneficial interest therefrom. The State 
cannot, therefore, be said to own the property to the 
exclusion of any legal or equitable interest in any 
one else. 
This was also addressed in St. Louis v. Wenneker, 47 
S.W. 105 (Missouri, 1898) wherein the Missouri Supreme Court 
held that property devised to the city in trust for a relief 
fund for emigrants was not exempt from taxation. The Court 
states: 
"We think that the property of a county or city 
exempted from taxation by the constitutional provision 
herein before quoted is that of which such county or 
city is the beneficial owner which is held by it "for 
its own use" and not merely in trust. It does not 
include that in which the only interest of the munic-
ipality is as trustee." 
This was reaffirmed in State ex rel. City of Saint 
Louis v. Bauman, Collector of Revenue 153 S.W. 2d 31, (Missouri, 
1941) wherein the court stated that the term "property" must, as 
a necessity, include both equitable as well as legal interests 
and that state ownership of property that is exempt is construed 
to comprehend both equitable and legal ownership. 
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In State v. Board of Commissioners of Beadle County, 
53 S.D. 609, 222 N.W. 583, the South Dakota Supreme Court states 
that 
"it is undoubtedly true that a provision exempting 
state owned property from taxation will not be held to 
exempt property to which the state holds mere legal 
title under circumstances such that the real benefi-
cial interest is in third persons." 
The Utah Supreme Court signaled its approval of this 
concept of ownership in Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 
104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335. However, while the holding in that 
case appears initially to support the position of the Appellant, 
in fact the result was based upon the application of the princi-
ple that only state owned property is exempt, which, when 
applied to the facts in the instant case yield a result that 
will favor the respondent. The determinative issue addressed in 
Duchesne is in fact similar to the issue addressed in 
Springville v. Johnson, supra.; whether property owned by the 
State is subject to taxation if the property is used for a 
proprietary rather than governmental purpose. In Duchesne, the 
state was a trustee for land held in trust for the State School 
Fund. Both the trustee and the beneficiary qualified for tax 
exempt status, and therefore the issue of whether property 
qualified for an exemption had the beneficiary been a non-exempt 
party was not addressed. 
The County argued that the fund property was subject 
to taxation because the state had acted in a proprietary manner 
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inconsistent with its governmental nature and therefore incon-
sistent with the reasons supporting exemption; to whit, the fund 
acquired property as a result of a business venture and fore-
closed property held by private parties in satisfaction of loans 
extended by the fund. The County also argued that the ex-
emptions applied to property held and used for the public 
generally and not to property used for specific purposes such as 
an express trust (the fact that the beneficiaries of the trust 
were tax exempt school districts was not addressed). The court 
discussed the historical evolution of the notions of "propriety" 
and "governmental" functions, and in so doing addressed and 
reaffirmed Springville v. Johnson by indicating that all proper-
ty owned by the state is exempt regardless of the fact that 
private persons may benefit from the property or the uses to 
which it is put, proprietary or governmental. The Board mis-
places the trust of the quotations cited from Duchesne. For 
example, the following quota by Justice Wade from Duchesne, when 
read in conjunction with the fact that the trustee and the 
beneficiary were both entities enjoying the benefits of ex-
emption from ad valorem taxation, addresses the ownership issue: 
"I concur in the result on the grounds that this is 
the kind of property that was intended under our 
constitution and statutory provision to be exempt from 
taxation, it being in trust for the benefit of 
schools, and it is immaterial whether it is held in a 
governmental or proprietary capacity, and whether it 
was once subject to taxation or not." 
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This and other quotations in fact provide additional 
support for the principle that all property owned by the state 
is exempt notwithstanding its use. This issue is not pertinent 
to the instant case. Instead, the County asserts that real 
estate, the ownership of which belongs to a group that does not 
benefit from exemption from ad valorem taxes, is subject to 
taxation. 
The Board also misplaces its reliance on New York 
State Teachers Retirement System v. Srogi, 84 A.D. 912, 447 
N.Y.S. 2d 57, a case similar to Duchesne that at first appears 
on point. The issue there was whether property acquired pursu-
ant to the foreclosure of a mortgage was exempt. The court 
found it was. However, the issue in the instant case is whether 
real estate is subject to ad valorem taxation because it is 
owned by non-exempt beneficiaries while legal title is held by a 
trust fund. 
An assimilation of these cases leads to the conclusion 
that (1) legal title does not equal "ownership" as the term is 
used with respect to property tax exemptions; (2) ownership 
generally means the beneficial owner, the person whose interest 
is primarily one of possession and enjoyment and (3) the concept 
of ownership is represented by certain rights or interests in a 
property. The Oklahoma court in Dunbar summarized this proposi-
tion by stating that to determine ownership" ...we must deter-
mine the quantum of interest which [the respondents] have in the 
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properties." The American Restatement of the Law, Trusts 2d, 
Section 2 pg. 7, confirms this in connection with property held 
in trust where it states: "The term "property" denotes inter-
ests in things and not the things themselves." Thus, the 
interests in property may be divided among legal title, benefi-
cial interest and possession; all own certain interests in the 
same property and yet terming any one an "owner" is incorrect 
without further explanation. However, the broad term "owner" is 
often used and usually refers to the person who owns the benefi-
cial interest. This definition of ownership is the one adopted 
by the Restatement. 
Applying these principles to the facts presented in 
the instant case leads to the conclusion that the beneficiaries 
are the "owners" of the Fund, and thus the underlying real 
estate. The interests of the state are as follows: 
The Utah State Retirement Office handles the daily 
administrative matters for the trustees and the fund; 
The Utah State Retirement Board acts as the trustee to 
control the custody, manage and invest the funds of 
the Fund; 
Assuming, only for the purpose of argument, that the 
Fund is considered an "agency" of the state, then 
legal title to the property is also an interest held 
by the state; 
However, the beneficiaries have the following interests: 
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Since the employee's contribution is "vested" at the 
time of contribution, he is an equitable owner of his 
pro-rata share of the Fund. His "bundle of rights" 
described by the retirement laws and contract may be 
summarized as an equitable beneficiary of a trust—an 
owner of property. Re: Skinner, 230 Iowa 1016, 300 NW 
1. 
Those employees with vested rights maintain at all 
times the rights to a "Refund" of an amount that 
represents the vested portion; 
The Fund as a whole belongs to the Beneficiaries whose 
rights have vested. The parties with vested rights 
have an absolute right to the proceeds, which is one 
of the premier rights subject to assertion. Thus, the 
beneficiaries with vested rights are the absolute 
owners of the Fund. Driggs v. Utah State Teacher 
Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657 (Utah, 1943). 
In conjunction with the right of "Refund," the benefi-
ciaries have the most significant interest that one 
may obtain—the risk of loss; for absent a culpable 
act by the trustee, the beneficiaries are ultimately 
at risk should the economic fortunes of the trust turn 
irrevocably into decline; 
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When the quantum of interests are compared, it is 
obvious that the beneficiaries are, under the aforementioned 
criterion, the "owners" of the fund. It is noted that neither 
party is ordinarily entitled to another of the most significant 
interests—the right to possession, and therefore is an irrele-
vant factor. Therefore, since the beneficiaries are the owners 
of the Fund, the section of the Utah Constitution and the 
implementing statute do not apply to the real estate that is the 
subject of this suit, leading to the conclusion that the prop-
erties are subject to taxation. 
D. The presumption in general is that exemptions from ad 
valorem taxation are to be strictly construed. This 
presumption is particularly strong in the case of 
property owned by a non-public body. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that all 
property, of whatever nature, is taxed unless specifically 
granted an exemption. Exemptions from taxation are to be 
narrowly construed and any doubt concerning whether or not the 
property will be granted an exemption must be resolved in favor 
of taxation. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly dismissed 
the legislature's attempts to expand the application of ex-
emptions by relying on the constitutional mandate that all 
property is taxed at its proportionate share for the support and 
maintenance of the government. See Good Shepherd Lutheran 
Church v. State Tax Commission, 54 P.2d 630 (Utah, 1976); Great 
Salt Lake Mineral and Chemical Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 
573 P.2d 337 (Utah, 1977). 
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In Salt Lake Lodge No, 85, B.P.O.E. v. Groesbeck, 120 
P.2d 192 (Utah, 1911), the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the 
reason for the existence of exemptions is that by exempting the 
property specified in the constitution, the state is presumed to 
receive benefits from the exempted property equivalent at least 
to the public revenue that would otherwise be derived therefrom. 
However, in the instant case, the property subject to the claim 
for exemption benefits only a class of private citizen-benefi-
ciaries by providing for the retirement of government employees. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen unequivocally acknowledged that 
the State Retirement Fund inures to the benefit of the 
beneficiaries individually by providing for their retirement and 
does not inure to the benefit of the state. 
Therefore, since the beneficiaries are the owners of 
the Funds, the presumption in favor of taxation must apply, and 
therefore the section of the Utah Constitution and the imple-
menting statute do not apply to the real estate that is the 
subject of this suit, leading to the conclusion that the prop-
erties are subject to taxation. 
POINT III 
TO EXEMPT THE REAL ESTATE FROM TAXATION WOULD 
PROVIDE FOR DISCRIMINATION WITHOUT A RATIONAL 
BASIS. 
The State of Utah, as an employer, has established 
a retirement plan for its employees. The retirement plan is 
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provided in addition to other employee benefits such as 
salary, life insurance, and health insurance. The State is 
in a situation similar to non-public employers with respect 
to plan requirements. It is submitted that providing 
exemptions to a retirement fund administered by the state 
while retirement funds, not state administered do not enjoy 
this benefit, violates the constitutionally guaranteed 
principle of equal protection. 
The Legislature maintains the power to distinguish 
between different classes which may be accorded inconsistent 
benefits or burdens as long as such distinction is supported 
by a rational basis. However, equal protection protects 
against discrimination within a class; the law must be 
applied equally to those similarly situated. 
The nature of the Fund as an enterprise comparable 
to non-public funds finds support in State tax Commission v. 
Department of Finance, 576 P.2d (Utah, 1978). Although this 
case involved the State Insurance Fund, the principles are 
applicable as the nature of the insurance fund is almost 
identical to the Fund. The assets of the Fund exist solely 
to cover obligations identical to those of a non-publically 
administered retirement fund. The Fund has the same admin-
istrative costs as a non-publically administered retirement 
fund. The Fund does not benefit a different class of 
citizens than does a non-publically administered retirement 
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fund. The only distinguishable feature is that it is 
administered by a public organization. 
The Utah Supreme Court discusses, in detail, the 
private aspects of the State Insurance Fund on page 1298 of 
State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, supra. The 
Court held that even though the insurance fund was adminis-
tered by a state agency, it was basically identical to a 
private insurance fund and could not be accorded preferen-
tial treatment. The assets of the insurance fund exist only 
to cover the identical obligation covered by private insur-
ers, that it had the same administrative costs as private 
insurers, and that it was self-supporting in that its 
expenses were paid by the contributors rather than govern-
mental appropriation. The Court indicated that the only 
distinguishing feature was that the fund was administered by 
the state. The Court held that the administration of a fund 
by a state agency is not a sufficient rational basis to 
distinguish the fund and treat it differently from other 
private insurers. 
This being the case, it is submitted that provid-
ing an exemption for property in which the state holds legal 
title as the trustee to the Fund while non-public funds fail 
to enjoy the benefit of tax exemption with respect to their 
real estate holdings is a violation of equal protection 
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since it irrationally discriminates against these non-public 
funds. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT WAS PROPER-
LY GRANTED. 
The County takes the position that the Motion of 
Summary Judgment was properly granted. The granting of the 
Motion was obviously made on the basis that as a matter of 
law, the real estate was not entitled to an exemption. In 
addition, the stipulation of facts was more than adequate in 
light of the nature of the controversy. There is no dispute 
as to the facts surrounding the controversy, merely a 
disagreement as to the application of the law to the facts. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that findings and conclusions are unnecessary on decisions 
of motions for summary judgment. The Court correctly 
concluded that, under Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, even if the evidence is viewed in a light most favor-
able to the losing party, the Respondents were entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Therefore, it is the position of the County that 
the Motion for Summary Judgment was properly granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion shows that: (1) the Fund is not a 
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property for which the exemption is sought is in the Utah State 
Retirement Fund. 
3. In Utah Code Ann. §49-9-10 the Legislature 
treated the Utah State Retirement Fund. That Fund was created 
or the purpose of providing retirement benefits to the 
mployees of the State of Utah. State and local public 
tnployees are members of the Utah State Retirement System, or 
ther public systems represented by the Fund, and may claim 
snefits from the Fund upon meeting certain qualifications. 
>re than one-half of the corpus of the Fund represents 
ntributions and earnings on contributions made by or on 
half of each employee and may be withdrawn by the employee 
ior to retirement if the employee leaves public employment in 
ah. 
4. There is no substantial difference in purpose or 
iration between the Utah State Retirement Fund created by 
ite statute and the pension fund created by a private 
poration and subject to federal statute and regulation. 
5. The Utah State Retirement Board was also created 
statute and named trustee of the corpus of the Fund ahd 
owed with certain powers to manage the Fund in accordance 
l statutory quidelines. See. Utah Code Ann. §49-9-3. The 
:d is also assigned to manage the affairs of the Utah State 
.rement Office, an independent State agency. 
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THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY DECIDED: 
1. Although the Appellant is an entity created by 
statute, it cannot be clearly identified as a state agency or 
political subdivision. 
2. The property tax assessment asserted by the 
espondent against certain property owned by the Appellant is 
treby affirmed. 
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To the foregoing decision rendered by my fellow 
ssioners, I hereby respectfully dissent. Although I can 
stand their position. I cannot justify the conclusion 
ed for the following reasons: 
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